POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT AND REVOLUTION IN MODERN STATES:

INTERROGATING THE NECESSITY OF REVOLUTION IN NIGERIA

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Abstract

This work identifies and discusses the phenomena of revolutions. While there is no consensus as to what constitutes a revolution, but revolution makes total alteration in the life of a political system. Several reasons have been deduced for revolutionary movements in countries. The reasons are so germane that when the government fails to carry out the constitutional responsibilities of the state. This essentially and particularly important in democratic societies when the ruling governments did not keep to the promises made to the electorates during electioneering campaigns. The failure of government sometimes influenced the military to stage a coup, and toppled the government even the democratic government elected by the people. The dictatorial governments have been removed either by the military coup d'état or revolution. Consequently, the contagious effect of the ancient or pre-twentieth revolution affected the twentieth-century revolutions, and

these revolutions equally spread to the current century even the "Arab Spring" between 2010 and 2012: Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain to mention a few. The change of governments has restored the hopes and aspirations of the people and the future of the countries and the people at large. The work convincingly argues that there is no single environmental factor that makes the revolutionary movement prevails. Series of events are what make revolution possible. Nigeria as a country has not experienced the phenomenon of revolution but has the government changed by the military on several occasions. The military in politics of Nigeria had made incremental adjustments, these 'patchwork' or reforms are not politically and holistically articulated, and perhaps the amendments have some political undertones. Today, both the objective conditions are readily available to triggers revolution even another military rule but only needs subjective conditions to trigger it. This paper argues that revolution is inevitable not even the change of government by the democracy or military will do, but a radical and fundamental adjustment to the political architecture of the country. Nigerians have been shortchanged for good governance. The paper concludes that to avert upcoming political upheavals and consequent of revolution which may alter the Nigerian state convincingly, the political leaders need to redesign governance in the country to meet the aspiration of the people in all ramifications.

Keywords: Revolution; Democracy; Good governance; Illegitimacy; Electoral Fraud; Corruption.

Introduction: We have seen that the people obey the state of the authority in their view, is legitimate, otherwise they may overthrow it (Johari, 1993:419).

Development in modern states not only limited the citizens' obedience to the legitimate order of the state, vis-à-vis the government but has political legitimacy to change and rule by a government that provides for the socio-economic and political wellbeing of the populace. The government becomes legitimate when it is rule by the people's consent and renders/or fulfills the social contract agreement, and provide basic amenities and needs. The provision of employment, health services, housing, and security are attributes of a good government. Beyond

service delivery, there is a smooth transfer of government, transparency, accountability, and good governance. The stability, and longevity of a government enjoy 'total' support even amid calamity, economic meltdown, and other social phenomena. Even in midst of many crises, the government continues to enjoy the sympathy of people and may 'lay' down their life for the regime. On the other hand, however, a government becomes illegitimate and unwanted when it failed in its social responsibility to provide necessities to the people. Such a government will not only last but crumble. Johari's (1993) observation is symbolic of a legitimate polity because the people obey it, and exhibit other characteristics such as common good, rule of law, fairness, equality, liberty, free and fair election, etc.

Revolution arises out of inequality and demands for socioeconomic and political equality and justice. Political elites control the socio-economic apparatus of the state. They are naturally endowed to rule in every social setting. The idea of elite rule is paramount and tied to the ability, capacity, skill, knowledge, and wealth of experience (Pareto, 1939; Mosca, 1935; Parry, 1971). These attributes in no small way contribute to domination, subjugation, and exploitation of civil society.

In liberal democracies, it is expected that the representatives make policies that uplift the peoples' hopelessness and static conditions. The legitimacies of governments in countries rests on the peoples' consents to fulfill the social agreements but becomes illegitimate and crumble amid disobedience of the citizenry, and make the state ungovernable through protests and demonstrations (Gauba, 2010). In a polity where there is a quantum of inequality, poverty, illiteracy, class domination, unemployment, political corruption, diseases, local and foreign wars, insurgency, economic distress, political inequality, marginalization, contract inflation, intolerance of oppositions, tenure elongation, control of the economy by foreigners, and illegitimacy crisis are vulnerable to new social order. What is this new order? Revolution seems to have answered many pertinent questions about many crises of governance in democratic and none democratic societies and fundamentally changed social order as witnessed in France, Russia, the USA, Libya, Cuba, and Britain among others.

However, the complexity of modern states, however, with vast populations, new technologies, political and economic inequalities, and corruption, and other vices of bad governance have not stopped. The issue of revolution, evolution, or partial adjustments in institutions of governance has continued. Some countries have used evolution, that is, gradual alteration, reform or redesigning the society's socio-political system as against a radical or bloodbath revolution that has claimed innocent lives of both the accelerators and the citizens "what happens, therefore, after the revolution is that it eats up its children. The worst part of a revolutionary drama is the shedding of blood and shattering of the prevailing system" (Johari, 1993: 457). Then, if this is how revolution works, how do we answer the question of good governance in Nigeria? Bossman (1705:146) observation of some people that Nigeria belonged, says "the Negroes are all without exception crafty, villainous and fraudulent and very seldom to be trusted and a man of integrity is as rare among them as a white falcon…" Even in the words of Burton (1864) "the Negro is always a child, that he never develops, and that the race is an inferior one which neither education nor anything else can rise to the level of the white". The rest of this chapter is divided into conceptualizing revolution and causes revolution: a world view, the creation of Nigerian state, government and governance in Nigeria, Nigeria, and revolution, and conclusions and way forward.

Meaning and Causes of Revolution

The term "revolution" Lissak (1976:28) says "has dozens of definitions". The definitional controversy in the literature even among the scholars in social sciences, Tilly and Rule (1965:2-3), distinguishes between the type of upheaval itself, its causes, and its consequences that mark revolution and coup d'etat "attempting to measure political upheaval, one must distinguish three clusters of phenomena". First, there are those characteristics of the social units undergoing upheaval which enter into the explanation of the upheaval. Second, there are the characteristics of the upheaval itself. Third, there are its consequences, real or supposed. These distinctions "are more subtle than they seem more subtle, because it is easy to slip into definitions, measurements, and classifications strongly influenced by the precipitating conditions or the consequences of the events under analysis…The most intensely political approaches to internal upheaval, for example, treat the transfer

of power as the event to be explained and thus (a) relegate "unsuccessful" attempts to second-class citizenship, and (b) include within the phenomenon events which narrower statements of the problem would treat as its consequences…" Michels (1915:3) says "revolutionary" is frequently applied simply to the struggle for liberty conducted by inferior classes of the population against superior (six), if this struggle assumes a violent form, whereas logically…revolution implies nothing but a fundamental transformation, and the use of the term cannot be restricted to described the acts of any particular class, nor should it be associated with any definite external form of violence".

The position of Michels (1915) is very clear on what constitutes a revolution, the idea of revolution covers not only political but also economic, social and cultural dimensions of human life "all hinging on the implications of change, whether peaceful or violent, total or partial, minor or major, slow or sudden and the like" (Johari, 1993: 420). Friedrich (1974:787) put the argument further, revolution "constitutes a challenge to the established political order and the eventual establishment of a new order radically different from the preceding one". Revolution, therefore, a rebellion against the established authority, and it is a sudden and violent change in the political system or the government of the state in respective of what form changes may take.

Revolution envisages changes and may take the form of political revolt. Revolt is an effective, ordinary violent action by which a group rejects the existing authority as well as the established social standards, and prepares to attack and destroy them. According to Ellul (1971:101), a revolt and revolution may, however, be drawn in the affirmation. Both phenomena hint at a sudden, jolting, and significant change in the existing system, the former does not imply the idea of 'profound change' as does the latter. The position of Johari (1993:420), a revolution not only differs from the revolt in terms of scope and intensity but is largely reform. A reform, for instance, a little alteration and amelioration, does not envisage total or major fundamental transformation which the accelerators and the society at large envisage. This argument is well supported by Marxists' scholars like Miliband (1977:157), who opines that "reformism" a way for the capitalists to check or defeat the purpose of a revolution.

Revolution is total which requires that a society that is sick needs medicine before it can be healed and require the "reconstitution of the state association is coincident with the substitution of one myth for another as the main integrating guide in the culture" (Petee, 1938:22). The new culture being envisaged here is a new form of rule, and norm as a mean to ensure new order that will lead to rapid and fundamental change which in the words of Huntington (1961:264) "a rapid, fundamental, and violent domestic change in the dominant values and myths of a society, in its political institutions, social structure, leadership, and government activity and politics". Little wonder, Kuhn (1960:93) tied revolution to some segments/ or group/s in the society who are dissatisfied with socio-economic cum political, and moral issues "political revolutions occur because the parties to revolution differ about the institutional matrix within which political change is to be achieved and evaluated". Arendt (1965:21) argues that revolution "is inextricably bound up with the notion that the course of history suddenly begins a new, that an entirely new story never known or told before is about to unfold". The untold stories which revolutionary leaders will convey to the followers, therefore, bring about those who will make the revolution happen. Moore (1963:81) revolution usually takes the form of violence and that it usually involves a percentage of the population that "engages a considerable portion or population, and results in a change in the structure of government". The population of Moor, 1989: 988). Here revolution combine three elements before revolution would take place namely: a coalition outside the existing polity makes exclusive claims to state power; these contenders receive support from significant elements of the population, against the old regime's directives; and, the police, army, etc prove unable or unwilling to repress the contenders and their supports, thus rendering incomplete the old regime's hold on the state (Tilly, 1978).

The population of a country may find it difficult to engage a ruling government in a struggle to unseat it without corrigible leaders or what Johnson (1964:98) has described as the "accelerator" and "the external environment" (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968:69). The accelerator is "the event which triggers a revolution in a society that is disequilibrated and has a discredited base of authority". A revolutionary struggle is usually originated by the displaced political elite to bring about desirable

change. They (insurgents) become the political leaders after a successful revolution has been carried out "occurs where, as a result of the challenge to the governmental elite, the insurgents are eventually able to occupy principal roles within the structure of political authority" (Tanter & Midlarsky, nd). Thus, revolution is a "shift in the class composition of elites" (Lasswell, 113) because the old elites had failed in their responsibilities to legislate correctly and legitimately to control the society, and became displaced (Dunn, 1972: 13) emphasis mine.

Marxist view of revolution is a radical alteration across structures of society. Such alternation would include a change in the class composition of the elites; the elimination of previous political institutions, or an alteration of the functions of these institutions; and finally, changes in the social structure, which would be reflected in the class arrangements and/or the redistribution of resources and income. Cohan (1975:31) describes the process as the alteration of values of myths of the society; social structure; constitutions "changes in the leadership formation either in personnel of the political elite or its class composition, transfer of power by legal or non-legal means, and preference or dominance of violent behavior made evident in the events leading to the collapse of the republic" (Cohan, 1975:31). According to Woddis (1972:1617). It is a holistic change affecting the structure of society from feudalism to capitalism, from capitalism to socialism "it is a change in which decisive political and economic power passes from the hands of a declining ruling class, which has outlived its day, into the hands of a new advancing class which is destined to take society forward to a new phase of development".

Revolution combines the elements of blessing and cursing. It is like the door of Janus that "has two faces. One is the elegant, abstract, and humanitarian face, an idyllic face, the dream of revolution, its meaning under the calm distancing of eternity. The other is crude, violent, and very concrete, rather nightmarish, with the hypnotic power of nightmare and the loss of perspective and breadth of understanding which you might expect to go with this" (Dunn, 1972:13). Some favor revolution because the evils in a social system are so deep-rooted that no amount of moderate reform will do. Burns (1920:130) argues that patchwork is not required to ameliorate the lot of the underdog, it is nothing but a

major operation that is required to dispense with the stock of injustice, corruption, demoralization, and the like. The very basis for all reform needs transformation. What is wrong is not this or that bad habit, this or that bad government, but all present social habits and the very essence of the existing government. The time has come for a change as great as would be involved taking the Sermon on the Mount seriously. The time has come to look to the very foundations of society, for in them is the flaw which has cracked the building."

On the other hand, those who are against revolution argue that a revolution is a curse since it unsettles the social, political, and economic order, "not a revolution but evolution can do what is needed by the people" and "…what happens, therefore, after the revolution is that it eats up its own children. The worst part of a revolutionary drama is the shedding of blood and shattering of the prevailing system" (Johari, 1993: 457). Burns (1920:133) expresses the same view, "in every actual revolution men have run riot: the violent have seized their opportunity; the ordinary man has been uncertain where to look or what to support. Hence come the bloodshed and destruction, which, if this argument holds, are essential and not accidental in revolutions.

From the foregoing, revolution is neither a blessing nor a curse. Change is the law of nature and, as such, it should be hailed in preference to a static pattern of life, while the process of change should continue unhampered and the patterns of social, economic, and political life should be adjusted. Accordingly, Friedrich (1974:791) says "political orders resemble forests and families. They contain the potentiality of self-renewal". The former America President W. Wilson once predicted that "there is nothing so conservative of life as growth…But not all change is progress, not all growth is the manifestation of life. Let one part of the body be in haste to outgrow the rest and you have the malignant disease, the threat of death" (quoted in Johari, 1993: 458). After the revolution alteration in the political system is a country. It is about social change. It is a change from an old regime to another, it is a redefinition of the new state, a change in the moral behavior of the polity and its citizens. It is the elimination of old order including all political crimes against the citizens, and foreigners alike. The revolution leads to new socio-political order through redrawing of new laws/ or norms that

govern the new state including the leaders, and the followers because it leads to the formation of new political parties, new foreign policies, and institutionalization of hitherto private enterprises with a mandate to develop the state, and create job opportunities and a new mode of production and creating and political ideologies that will cement the state and civil society together.

Numerous reasons have been deduced for the revolutionary movement and the displacement of old establishments in many countries. Scholars have given divergent reasons to what constitutes or factors that make a revolution occur. Magstadt (2006:452) argues "to say that revolutions grew out of injustice, or perceived injustice, reflects a philosophical consideration of revolution. Such a view emphasizes the importance of injustice as a cause of action; that is, the idea that government has acted unfairly or unjustly is seen as a principal cause of revolution". This is true and justifies the occurrence of revolutions, the idea of revolution does not begin spontaneously "they spring from and are nurtured by human responses and reactions to changing political, cultural, social and/ or economic conditions of the environment" (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968:37). While these views are particularly important, at the same time they influenced changes of governments "certainly no one environmental model will elucidate the causes of the revolution. The contextual factors of space and time will provide a general milieu in which a revolution must be examined" (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968:52).

Johnson (1964:12, 98) develops an equation for revolution or what he called multiple dysfunctions plus elite intransigence plus an accelerator equals revolution. The "accelerator" is the event that triggers a revolution in a society that is disquilibrated and that has a discredited base of authority. The accelerator, Russell (1974:51) is the rise of a prophet or messiah in a dysfunctional society or the defeat of a regime in a foreign war. A disquilibrated society is what Johnson referred to as "dysfunction". For him, dysfunction "is the condition that demands the response of social change and revolution (Johnson, 1964:5). Thus, "accelerators of dysfunctions" he says, the trigger and objective conditions are necessary before a revolution can occur, "accelerators are occurrences that catalyze or throw into relief the already existent revolutionary level of dysfunctions. They do not of themselves cause a

revolution, but when they do occur in a system already bearing the necessary level of dysfunctions…, they will provide the sufficient cause of the immediately following revolutions" (Johnson, 1964:12).

Eckstein (1965:140) distinguish between "pre-conditions" and "precipitants". Like Johnson's "accelerator", Eckstein used "precipitants" as the conditions that trigger revolution "by a precipitant he (Eckstein) means an event that initiates violence, by preconditions he (Eckstein) means the circumstances that make it possible for the precipitant to produce violence" (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968:38) emphasis mine. Eckstein concluded that "clearly no internal war can occur without precipitant events to set it off, and no precipitants can set off internal war unless the condition of society makes it possible for them to do so". These conditions include poverty, corruption, illegitimate government, unemployment, etc.

Leiden and Schmitt (1968:39) associated "foreign control" with the revolutionary movement. For instance, when a country depends on the other country especially the relationship between the holders / or alleged holders of political power and economic resources {dependent (or who believe themselves dependent) on them}. The relationship may not constitute or treat revolution, but the "powerful sectors of "dependent" elements, first of all, may conclude that they are dependent; secondly, the dependency is somehow unjust or improper, and thirdly, they can do something to change that relationship". The control of the economy by foreigners in some countries like Cuba, Moscow, Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, Syria, among others is responsible for the cause of the revolution. Hoffer (1958:42) attributed frustration in the colonial areas to the crumbling or weakening of communal solidarity and ways of life among tribally organized peoples, the people discontent is directed not primarily against exploitation by domineering foreign but stems from disorientation that results from the imposition of Western political, economic, and social structures upon more primitive natives through which "the nationalist movements in the colonial countries are partly striving after group existence and escape from Western individualism".

Marxists centered revolution on the economic condition in society. The school believes that the strongest human motives for social change lay

in the drive for improved productive conditions. Karl Marx argues that when the current mode of production is not inconsistent with prevailing social circumstances and those political institutions, and structures had continued to increase the misery of the people, the gap between the bourgeoisie, and the proletariats can only be reconciled through a revolution so that new life will begin for the bourgeoisie, the proletariats, and the society at large, a revolution occurs when conditions are worsening tends to come when an oppressive regime lightens the burdens and attempts some reforms (Tocqueville cited in Friedrich, 1966).

Social dislocation is a necessary cause that produces a revolution in new nations when there is a rise in new socio-economic groups including the disturbance of old income patterns, the unevenness of economic growth, the creation of new wealth by the new political elite, and new poverty side by side as contributing to frustration, discontent, and upheaval" when the majority of the populace shows dissatisfaction with existing conditions (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968:43; Stone, 1966:173). Political disputes are the manifestation of revolution when the government seems to be intransigent/ or indifferent in the crisis between the state and who would-be revolutionaries. A responsive government may consider giving some political concessions through additional representation, widening the suffrage, open government, job opportunities, and ease the entry of new groups into political office than guarantee new minimum wages, provide schools and cultural centers, and decent health and housing facilities for the masses. All these usually strengthen and increase regime popularity and acceptance. However, "estrangement between governing elite and its subjects" is argued "in a pre-modern society may lead to revolution if the rulers adopt new social customs and mores that are alien to their people" (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968:45). The problem of alienation between the government and citizens in terms of policy formation and implementation, and other basic amenities, that is, housing, employment, security, may lead to political upheaval. The problem of insensitivity on the part of national governments has led to political instability, upheavals through series of coup d'état, and revolution in many societies.

Defects of the ruling government accounted for revolution in premodern and modern eras. A weak government may not necessarily produce disorder or revolutionary movement, but when the government is insensitive and not alive to certain responsibilities usually breed potential discontent that individuals and groups will attempt to unseat a government. The "weakness" of government does not only encourages revolution but it "permits the growth of dissident groups, spawning a plurality of loyalties and chaotic interactions" (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968:47). He says further, disruption of the incumbent power structure" increase disintegration of the ruling elite is associated with weakness of the government can uproot a ruling regime "where an elite has lost its vitality, the result is weakness or apathy". Scholars like Eckstein (1965:146) believes that the "internal wars" between the ruling elite and lack of internal coordination and disagreement on political issues are common features that may tear apart any ruling elite "a ruling elite may decay, may become torn by severe conflict, may be reluctant to use power, may come to lack vital political skills and thus make it perfectly possible for a relatively weak, even disorganized, the opposition of a sort that may exist in any political system to rise against it and destroy it.

Sometimes, the interaction between the government and the dissident and government had turned unproductive increase "internal wars" and revolution (Eckstein, 1965: 151). Institutional decay, "functional failures", or "elital failure" particularly the loss of manipulative skill, military superiority, loss of self-confidence, estrangement from none elite, inability to cope with the financial crisis, incompetence, and inability of a government to embark on quick reform may be fatal and leads to it being removed from power as well fails to anticipate the need for reform, if it blocks all peaceful, constitutional means of social adjustment, then it units the various deprived elements in single-minded opposition to it, and drives them down the narrow road to violence" (Stone, 1966:165; Brinton, 1956).

Eckstein (1965150) opines that political alienation of the intellectual community of a society by the ruling government is a vital element that breeds revolution and makes "revolutionary momentum irreversible" because the group has been trained to shaping attitudes, providing

guidelines to behavior, educating adolescents and young people, and in developing political "myths" of the society "to write or teach in those days meant being against the government" Brinton (1956:47). For instance, Tom Paine's pamphlets and other pieces of literature influenced the American people including the renewed revolutions the world has witnessed.

From the above, a single factor may not be sufficient to produce revolution, revolt, or coup d'état. In other words, no single factor can explain revolution as well as a change of government "certainly no one environmental model will elucidate the causes of the revolution. The contextual factors of space and time will provide a general reason through which a revolution must be examined" (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968:52). Thus, what constitutes revolution largely lie the conditions of government, environmental factors, peoples' conditions, and the influence of foreign government because any phenomenon of revolution can only be meaningful through various circumstances available to the societies where revolutions had taken place, and where revolution is going to happen "it is always possible, after the event, to describe the environmental pattern in persuasive and convincing terms, that is, it is possible to demonstrate the fact that revolution did occur and ought to have occurred where and when it did" (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968:52). Revolution is not a predictable event because the revolution has not occurred in relatively developed societies, nor heterogeneous states characterize with uncertainties. Peoples' discontent with their government can take many forms either to subsist the government or mar the existing government. Also, religious and racial discrimination and persecution certainly can result in inconsiderable unrest, often punctuated by tremors of violence. In most cases, however, such discrimination is the act of a majority (and where it is not, as in South Africa, it is the act of an extremely powerful minority), such unrest does not always presage revolution. Generally, when the political elite fails to give attention to good governance that has to do with the wellbeing of the citizenry, trigger protects, demonstrations that on many occasions had led to coup d'états or revolutions as demonstrated in many societies especially in developing countries.

Revolution: A World View

The issue of revolution has its root in the work of Rousseau that since the people instituted the government, the people ought to control it and change it as they pleased if the government is not doing well. The need for the people who 'own' the country when the government failed to lead to an uprising, rebellions against the government. The people decide whether to continue in their state of despair, uncertainty, fare, lawlessness, brutality, poor, short, nasty, or change it to a more pleasant loving, equity, fairness, rule of law, and constitutional order. The need for change is resonated in Lincoln's First Inaugural Address to the American people "this country, with its institutions, belongs to the people who inhabit it. Whenever they shall grow weary of the existing government, they can exercise their constitutional right of amending it, or their revolutionary right to dismember or overthrow it" (Lincoln, quoted in Deutsch, 1974:94). The phenomenon of revolution has been part and parcel of the ancient or traditional, and contemporary societies even in the world to come. The gamut of revolutions had shaped some political societies to be better ones, while other attempts at the change of governments.

Revolution had its history in the year before the Birth of Christ or BC, spanning from C.2380 BC49-45 BC (Ober, 1996). Also, after the death of Jesus Christ or AD spanning from 6-9-982 (Burke, 2000). There is also a period between 1000-1899 and period of 1900 2000 (Kunnen-Jones, 2002; White, 2000; Latkovskis, 1953; Tripp, 2005), and from 2010 to date (http://enwikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_revolutions_and_reb ellions). These periods had their varied revolutions or coup d'états that shaped many societies. Each of these upheavals cum revolutions had influenced other uprising in other spheres. In many cases, past revolutions and revolutionary waves inspire current ones, "affiliate revolutions" intending to achieve what other revolutionary movements had achieved in their polities, that is, a better life (Katz, 1999; Sohrabi, 2011). Revolution is a world phenomenon and had occurred throughout human history, particularly during times of strong population and rapid economic change (Goldstone, 1983). Before the twentieth century, there were about 256 revolutions, while at the beginning of the twentieth century to date there were about 350 (http://en-wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_revolutions_and_rebellions). According to

Magstadt (2006:437) revolution about the twentieth century had occurred more frequently than ever before "in a sense, revolutions were part of a surge in national violence that marked most of the century". There were "internal disturbances" in eleven political communities, while 1,622 disturbances in the postworld War I stood at 70% involved in "violence and bloodbath on a considerable scale", while between 1945-1970, in new nations, there were "fully 40 of the approximately 100 developing countries witnessed at least one military takeover of government (Sorokin in Greene, 1989:5). And between 1943 and 1962, attempts to overthrow an existing government occurred in virtually every country in Latin America, in two-thirds of the countries of Asia, and in half of the African countries that had gained independence. The New York Times reported that there were about 1,200 separate instances of "interwar", including "civil wars, guerilla wars, localized rioting, widely dispersed turmoil organized and unorganized terrorism, mutinies, and coup d'etat". Thus, revolution and coup d'état had swept away old governments, "if violence, organized and unorganized, has always been an integral part of political life, in the twentieth century it became both better organized and more prevalent" (Magstadt, 2006:438).

Between 2011 and 2012, the world had recorded four revolutions without counting successful and unsuccessful coup d'états. And no one knows when revolution or coup d'état will stop, but as much as we continue to have unreasonable policies being enacted by the governments, the more revolutions or change of governments we will live with "but no one can at present speak with authority on the likelihood or improbability of revolution anywhere at any given time, much less the course that a revolution might take" just as the American Revolution, there were revolutionary movements in other countries that had taken arms and wrestled power from their governments. It was hope that the 20th century may not produce more revolutions than what we have witnessed like Mexican Turkey, Egypt, Cuba, Russia, etc but the record before us is alarming (Leiden & Schmitt, 1968:214).

The Britain and Creation of the Nigerian State

Nigerian state acquired her prominence on the world map when she got political independence in 1960. Historically, the country has existed as

independent nations before 1861 when the British government launched and attached her through the Lagos Lagoon and the bombardment for three days that led to the formal annexation and colonization. After the acquirement of Lagos, there was a manhunt for the rest of the Yoruba nation, and their leaders particularly the Obas were publicly hanged accused of obstructing British rule. The British political domination spread to other parts of the country with several kingdoms disposed and political leaders who obstructed the rampaging imperialists were arrested, deposed, exiled, and killed.

The conquest of the Nigerian state at this time did not commence the imperial governance instead; the British warlords handed over the country to the Royal Niger Company to oversee the territory until 1899, while 1900 marked the coming back of the British government to formally lay claim to the whole territory (Olaniyan & Alao, 2003). At the initial stage, the country was balkanized into segments: the Northern and the Southern protectorates between 1900-1914. Again, in 1906, the two protectorates remained what they were but there was the creation of Lagos Colony that served as the Headquarters of the British rule, notwithstanding the creation of the Eastern region in 1948. However, the agitations and suggestions by Morel and Temple for the equitable division of Nigerians were ignored (Olaniyan & Alao, 2003).

The name "Nigeria" remained elusive until 1912 when Flora Shaw who later became Lord Lugard's better half suggested Nigeria as a name to be accorded the whole country. In other words, a foreigner, and strange woman named the entire entity, Nigeria.

The attempt by the colonial government not to spend their hardearned revenues on the newly found colony instigated the amalgamation of the different ethnic groups including the unknown minority groups in 1914 (Udoma, 1994; Oyediran, 2007). Having observed the practicality and efficacy of Indirect Rule elsewhere, the policy was adopted as a political mechanism to govern the Yorubas, Igbos, and Hausa/ Fulanis. However, the policy of indirect rule was only meaningful and successful in the Emirate system, while in the whole Southern protectorate dominated by the Igbos and Yorubas was a failure. The colonial government created institutions for easy administration. For instance, the Governor's

Executive Council only made law and order for Lagos as the Headquarters of the British government in Nigeria, while Governor single-handedly provided legislations for the whole country. The Nigerian Council consisting of nominated members including both the Europeans and Africans had no executive nor legislative powers because the Council "was merely advisory" (Oyediran, 2007:7).

The promulgation of the Clifford Hugh Constitution of 1922 provided for the constitutional government for the whole country, but in reality, only the southern part of the country enjoyed the legal government, while the provision did not cover the Northern region (Oyediran, 2007). Put this way, for 24 years, the North was not ruled by law but by mere proclamations of the British government. Little wonder that Sir Abubakar Tafawa Balewa who later became the first Prime Minister started that "since the amalgamation of the Southern and Northern provinces in 1914, Nigeria … existed as one country only on paper" (quoted in Oyediran, 2007:3). Twenty-four years after, the Richard Constitution of 1946 consolidated the division of Nigeria into three dominant regions without attention paid to minority agitations. Although, the Constitution provided for the unity of the country within its diversity, yet the British constitutional engineering in Nigeria not only united the people but furthered their segmentation until the promulgation of the Lyttleton Constitution of 1954 that put the authority and political identity on the regional and federal governments. In the attempt to bring the peoples together by the British colonial government, the tribes remained at loggerheads with each other particularly the minority groups scheming for political recognition.

At the departure of the colonial masters, Nigeria remained divided as they were before the political amalgamation. The founder of the Action Group party in the early 1950s, Obafemi Awolowo described the country's amalgamation as "a mere geographical expression" (Awolowo, 1947:47). Put directly, the British mission in Nigeria from 1861 to 1960 did not unite the peoples into a nation just as in the sense of which England, Wales, and France are nations (Ayandele, 1974; Awolowo, 1947). The British interest in Nigeria is largely on economic benefits. Akinboye and Anifowose (2015) observe that amalgamation is centered on the desire to use the resources from the Southern part to feed

the "poorer neighbors" (the north) and brought together different peoples of social, economic, political, and ideological backgrounds without harmonization and political orientation; there existed political and administrative polarization between them even with the creation of the Eastern region. This is no surprise that shortly after independence, the British efforts became a nonentity in the sense that all the "patch-works", constitutional amendments including the institutionalization of political parties, pacification of one part of the country against the others, that is, the politics of "divide and rule" could not be contained by the already polarized regional leaders including their subjects because party politics degenerated into politics of ethnicity, intra-party, and inter-party wrangling, heavy rivalry, political tension, the disorder in government and governance since politics is seen as wealth and caused socioeconomic hardship and underdevelopment because the country "inherited a weak socio-political structure, a defective and unbalanced federation, an intensification of ethnic consciousness and rivalries, a subverted indigenous ethos of government and culture, and above all, an inexperienced leadership" (See Report of Political Bureau, 1987:31).

Government and Governance in Nigeria

Before the political independence, the amalgamated people existed as a distinct entity and independently, while occasionally come together to do commerce. They have different types of government. for instance, the Oyo Empire was dominated and controlled by the Alaafin of Oyo, the Oyo Mesi, and the Ogboni Secret Society. These institutions were responsible for the law and order and governance of the Yoruba nation. In the North, the Emirate system was dominated by Emirs and assisted by the Senior title holders in the discharge of legislative and executive functions. Both the Yoruba and Hausa nations enjoyed decentralization and centralization of political systems. The Ibo political system was acephalous because authority was based on individuals and upon the family groups. The executive and legislative functions are not centered on any specific political institution.

At the advent of colonial rule, these political entities were brought together and remained under a single administration for close to a century. Thus. the colonial government administered the country with

different policies that seem suitable for their convenience. While the colonial government lasts, the citizens were given little development, this clear because the colonial rulers built residential quarters, roads to their official quarters and offices with running taps, security, electricity were made visible and functional. Besides, the construction of railways and other roads were linked to the selected farms, farmers, and seaports for easy movement of farm products onward to the metropolis.

The quest for political inclusion into the administration and governance by the educated elite and more so the nationalists were allowed to form political parties as political instruments to represent the people and themselves. At this instance, there were regional governments dominated by Nigerians and consequently regional autonomy and lastly independence of Nigeria as a whole in 1960 with an elected Nigerian, Abubakar Tafawa Balewa exercised the executive authority of the federation on behalf of the Queen of England in far-away Britain (Oyediran, 2007; Dudley, 1968; Akinboye & Anifowose, 2015).

Nigeria since 1960 and now has been under different governments, namely: the civil, the military, and civil rules. The first Republic witnessed relative socio-economic development especially at the regional lines because each region was known for one kind of agricultural product and the other. The western region in particular relied on the cocoa production that responsible for free education and other developments. Other regions also prided themselves on cotton, palm oil, rubber, and so on. There was a holistic economic competition between the regions for development in all ramifications. Ake (1982) remarks Nigeria had existed only through the exploitation of her farmers (in Mundt, Aborisade & LeVan, 2008). In other words, Nigerian farmers not only produced enough food to feed none farmers, but the government on several occasions intervened to ameliorate food scarcity through the subsidization for farmers as well as made payments to farmers for the supply of goods to citizens in urban areas.

The government and governance between 1960 and 1966 were controlled by the coalition of the NPC and NCPC. Alhaji Tafawa Balewa became the federal Prime Minister, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe as the Governor-General. Ideologically, the coalition was not compatible

because NPC opposed the creation of a supranational continent governmental including the policy of alignment with the western bloc, while the NCNC was ambitious for a government of a United States of Africa, that is, a continental government and none alignment policy (Ojo, 2012). The government continued until 1966, but within 6 years was "a draft government without a sense of purpose" since the administration was dominated by ethnicity and pursuance of power, and lacked purposeful governance at the center (Ojo, 2012). Dare (1989) identifies areas in which the coalition arrangement created a crisis and allied not to last beyond three years. First, the alliance of 1959 was a marriage of convenience between NPC/NCNC because the NCNC members dominated the ministerial appointments, while Nnamdi Azikiwe automatically became the first Nigerian Governor-General in October 1960; NCNC was dissatisfied when NPC allocated about E670 million to the North contrary to the position of NCNC who had hoped the sixyear National Development Plan 1962-1968 would come to the Eastern Region; the NCNC was disappointed when the Iron and Steel Industry originally located in the East was split into two - one in the North and the other in the East. The dominance of NPC, therefore, required no support of the NCNC to govern at the center, which led to disappointment and disadvantaged in its alliance with NPC. The purpose of alliance and expected returns in terms of political largesse instead the members and supporters of the NCNC were intimidated and persecuted politically.

The position of the NPC government was furthered strengthened by the policy of "Northernization" which screwed the northern development to a policy of "enclosure" (Dudley, 1968). According to him, the enclosure of NPC to the North and by extension its domination of the political scene at the center showed the hegemonic and monopolistic tendencies and commandist nature of the NPC government, and control of the majority in the national assembly especially after the controversial results of censure figures. The drive by the NPC to control not only its domain but the rest of the country was the result of the structural imbalance of the federation. The control of the federal government by the North as well as NPC gave the NPC government opportunities to determined political patronages and the place of Northerners in high offices. According to him, the NPC-led-federal government "played the

federal game according to its rules and wishes" and as well "monolithic character…guaranteed it specific economic and political advantages" (Dudley, 1968:299). The advantage of the North furthered accentuation of the region to dominate bureaucracy and became "expression of the class functionaries who thereby provided the factor linking the party, the executive and the bureaucracy together" (Dudley, 1968:297). In other words, the need for the federal government to be responsible for the whole people of Nigeria, the reverse was the case.

Peil (1976) observes that the party leaders were more 'tribalistic' than people in the middle or lower ranks of society. Arguing that the use of ethnicity is more important to them than to people with lesser opportunity. And that Nigeria society functions more within ethnic power groups and the politicians joined one of these to succeed in their political career. Second, Nigerian politicians found it difficult to win elections by universalistic appeals to ideology, whereas communal war cries were popular and important for the success of his ambition; and lastly, there are many things which have become mis-normal (imbalance federal structure, corruption, electoral corruption, etc) in the polity, ethnic scapegoating is a useful way of easing pressure for political reform. The individual idiosyncratic interests make the politicians accept that ethnic or sub-ethnic identification is the only way the gates of opportunity, patronage, and as well to get their share of national cakes (Peil, 1976:73). According to Sklar (1971:47) "opinion follows interest, and many young adults furthered their careers by adopting regionalist principles and tribalist ideologies". Once they assume political offices, communal and collegial pressures ensure that they maintain the norm, and "since everyone else is filling his department, corporation, or section with his people, I must do the same; otherwise, my people will not find jobs at all". Ostheimer (1973), the issue of power dominated the events of the First Republic. The state power was used to enhance the position of the tribal groupings with which the individual was allied. It is this struggle for power that eroded and overshadowed the niceties of constitutional provisions, which fundamentally altered the twelve state structures. According to him, the scope for influence by individual politicians was increased; the creation of more states and centralization of power served as the potential weapon for personal wealth and power that destroyed the center. For him, the First Republic was shaped within

the sub-national (personal and ethnic) purposes and these events were interpreted in the ethnic of politics. The instability which breeds the power struggle was too intense and widespread created concern with power and the resources available to those in power (Peil, 1976). Indeed, the socio-economic and political outcome in the First Republic was what the departed colonial government planted and accurately harvested by those who inherited the Nigerian project from them. Beyond the census controversy, the Action Group, the 1964 federal election, the 1965 western regional election crises, they all consolidated the seed of discords in the colonial days such as political imbalance, and unequal representation at the federal level, motion for independence, a political pogrom in the North and division created between the south and north for two decades and four years. These and other problems had influenced the Nigerian military to struck and save the country from a further crisis (Ademoyega, 2011; Iroanusi, 2000; Akinboye & Anifowose, 2015).

Military rule is generally regarded as an aberration, but it becomes inevitable when the political class or the politicians failed to adhere to democratic principles including the procedures for selection and appointment of party representatives. More so that democracy as a form of government, although not actually "rule by the people" (Gauba, 2010:474) but only allows people's participation in two ways: determine the ends towards which government should aim; and oversee the representatives who have actual power of administration. The attitude of politicians in the administration of governance fails the test of liberal democratic tenets. They are not accountable, transparent, and tolerant of opposition that political power is being seen as an end to itself and exclusive right, and this by and large influenced the incursion of the military in governance in Nigeria because politics was ethnicized, political parties personalized including the state power and national resources.

The scholars of the military in politics have postulated several reasons by which the "khaki" boys in government become inevitable. Welch and Smith (1974) observe, social cleavages are the primary characteristics of praetorian polities, where existing political institutions are infective in moderating social conflict and channeling the energies of contending

groups towards common goals. As cleavages reinforce one another, governments become identified with the self-fish interests of a particular group, region, or class. These civilian factions who perceive themselves as not receiving their fair share of the available status, wealth, or political power may become alienated and actively work to overthrow the established order. In doing so, they may create the conditions of public disorder and governmental ineffectiveness that draw the armed forces into politics". Beyond the societal cleavages, Nwabuzor and Muller (1985:180) have summarized the postulation of Welch and Smith into the general social factor:

Those social-economic forces within the larger political system impinge upon the society's ability to perform as a coherent whole. These factors are usually not the creation of the military, but since the armed forces are a part of the political community (albeit sometimes isolated because of their special functions), they sooner or later is to reflect in their actions some of the imperfections of the larger societal environment". Some of the societal environment.

Nothing can be responsible for societal instability if not when illegitimacy is created by such political maladies such as corruption in government and lacked consensus among the civilian elites regarding the rules governing political competition and succession (Nwabuzor & Muller, 1985).

The military intervention is considered to be responsible for the widening of social cleavages, loss of illegitimacy by civil government, constitutional malfunction, economic conditions, poverty, and corruption among others. With these factors, the military may not need another reason/s to show register their presence in the polity. According to Orizu (1985:29) about the Nigerian coup of 1985, he says "I have tonight been advised by the Council of Minister that they had come to the unanimous decision voluntarily to handover the administration of the country to the Armed forces of the Republic of Nigeria with immediate effect" emphasis mine.

The Balewa led Federal Government was removed from power. The government was plagued by serious crises such as corruption,

inefficiency, and maladministration, election malpractices, intolerance of opposition among others. These crises opened the floor gate for political instability that followed were reasoned by the coupists to fight corruption, dishonesty, inefficiency, maladministration, mismanageme nt of the economy, ethnicity, etc. These reasons have been constantly used as the justifications for ousting civilian governments in Nigeria. A scholar has observed that "politicians during Nigeria's First Republic (1960-1966) displayed their stolen wealth flagrantly in the face of mass poverty, and corruption became a common word in the lexicon of the Nigerian populace. It appeared as if this cankerworm has become an intractable phenomenon in the nation's politics". The coup led by young military officers was headed by Major C. K. Nzeogwu invaded the corridors of political power and removed the anointed government (Nwabuszor & Mueller, 1985: 181). After the coup, Nzeogwu commented right "our enemies are the political profiteers, the swindlers, the men in high and low places that seek bribes and demand ten percent (First, 1976:112).

Barely 24 hours after this speech, the coup was overthrown on January 16, 1966, with Major General J.T. U. Aguiyi-Ironsi became the new Head of state. While the new regime was meant to correct identified problems in the nation, the intention was a good and welcome development but Ademoyega (2011:28) described the political atmosphere before the coup, generally, the people had been disillusioned and disaffected with the Balewa Government and the rulership of the Balewa/Akintola/Surdauna clique of the NNA, socio-economic, educational, political hatred, ethnicity, and political problems were not solved, while corruption and nepotism were the other of the day:

The safety values of the nation were reposed in such institutions as the courts… But the sanctity of those institutions was being politically assailed, assaulted, and dragged in the mud so that they were fast losing their credibility. It became obvious that the national leadership was nearing its collapse and that the ship of the nation was heading for the rocks. Still, it was drummed into people's ears by the Federal Government's radio, television, and newspaper that certain NPC leaders had said that the NPC would rule Nigeria for the next twenty-five years.

No doubt, the wishes and feelings of the electorate were not taken into consideration.

Indeed, tribalism, political rascality, inter-party and intra-party strife dominated the First Republic (Post and Vickers, 1973). Justifying the importance of the coup, Mainasara (1982:8) was the "redemption of the country as not their aim. Their purpose was to prevent a section of the country, the North, from effective participation in the governance of the country".

The period between the takeover of government and May 23 remained inactive as far as the political situation in the country was concerned. On May 24, 1966, the regime rolled out Decree No. 34 which abolished hitherto the federal structure. This practically changed the configuration of Nigeria into "a unitary form of government in the country" (Elaigwu, 1979:158). According to the Decree No. 34 "Nigeria shall on the 24 May, 1966… cease to be a federation and shall accordingly as from that day be a Republic by the name of the Republic of Nigeria, consisting of the whole territory which immediately before that day was comprised in a federation" (cited in Elaigwu, 1979:162). The former regions were abolished and the country was regrouped under territorial areas now addressed as Provinces. The old regions are now to be known as "group of provinces". A new National Military Government as against the Federal Military Government was established. According to the National Military Government, the Decree was "intended to remove the last vestige regionalism of the recent past, and to produce that cohesion in the government structure which is so necessary in achieving and maintaining the paramount objective of the National Military Government, … national unity" devoid of hatred, nepotism, corruption, ethnicity which hitherto pervaded the country (Elaigwu, 1979:138). Other political reforms embarked upon by the regime included: the unification of civil services throughout the country into "National Public Service" (Ijalaye, 1979:145).

The January 1996 coup would have restructured or reshaped the configuration of the country for the better, but as Elaigwu (1979) commented "Ironsi's tragedy may be seen in his vacillation. He missed the opportunity he had, to effect changes in January 1966. By May, he

had lost his credibility appreciably, and suspicion had heightened once again. Perhaps, Ironsi should have realized that political leadership required the ability to know the environment well, to feel the political temperature of the system, and to know the limits to which decisions can be taken without threatening the basic consensual values which bind the society together. The fall of the first Military regime is illustrative of the relative weakness of the center, in the face of centrifugal pulls in the regions. As regions pulled their strings, instability loomed at the center" (Ijalaye, 1979:164). Indeed, this is the gory state of the first coup in Nigeria. After the assumption of office, it has nothing or no what to do within the political power seized through "barrel of the gun". The first military in Nigeria suffered an illegitimate crisis, and cannot have solved the problem it claimed to have come to heal. In the space of 24 hours, two heads of state emerged in the same society, in the same military formation, and in the same regime, "Ironsi and his host, Lieutenant-Colonel Fajuyi the Military Governor of the West, were both arrested by Major Danguma and his accomplices. They removed the arrested leaders to a nearby bush, tortured them and short them" and a "dramatic end of the regime of deceit, bad faith, ambivalence, misdirection, and misrule. Ironsi's regime was a colossal failure" (Ademoyega, 2011:165).

The inability of Ironsi's regime to act decisively on time led to an untimely end and of his government. The 'revenge coup' came on 29 July 1966, a space of 5 months and two weeks, and a few days. The countercoup was masterminded by the Northern Military officers (Elaigwu, 1979). The earlier coup was perceived as an "Igbo coup" because many northerners were eliminated including their topnotchers. Lt. Col. Yakubu Gown became the Head of State in August 1966. He promised to democratize Nigeria and to hand it over in 1976 to an elected president. In 1974, the regime reneged on this promise, when Gown declared in 1974 that the handing over date is "unrealistic" (Newswatch, January 20, 1986). On the assumption of office, the regime changed "the political pendulum right back to the position of 17 January 1966. The Central Government became known again as the Federal Military Government. The hostility between the Federal Government of Nigeria and the Eastern Nigeria Government between 1967 and 1970 witnessed political pogrom on both sides. After the war that lasted for 30 months, the regime declared "no victor, no vanquished" and

embarked on the project of reconciliation, reconstruction, and re-habitation.

The Gowon regime was spendiferously rich through the oil boom "the popular belief in government a circle as a result of the oil boom and quantum of monies then was that Nigeria's problem was no longer how to make money but how to spend it" (Babawale, 1999:105). The regime assumed the role of 'father-Christmas and disbursed the oil money sparingly to many African countries. This is what Akinboye (2013) called "beautiful abroad but ugly at home…" The Gowon government was corrupt "the scale of corruption in Gowon's administration was extremely high. Sacred or 'super' permanent secretaries emerged and Gowon was unable to remove his lieutenants against who allegations of corruption were leveled. An example was late Chief J. S. Tarka, a commissioner in Gown's cabinet who was accused of corrupt enrichment but who still retained his seat. This statement shows that Nigerian leaders like him are visionless and myopic about the future. He failed to anticipate upcoming generations, industrialization, social facilities, like wider roads, housing, energy, public health, education among others. Nigeria witnessed the oil boom as well as humongous revenue enough for the government to satisfy the needs of the citizens. The administration in the spirit of charity willfully gave money and materials to the Nigerian neighboring states. For easy governance to the citizens, the hitherto four regions viz: the north, east, west, and Midwest were turned into 12 states to avert the impending civil war. Yet, the state creation, however, did not stop the unnecessary 30months of civil war in Nigeria (Akinyemi, Cole & Ofonagoro, 1979). The administration of Gowon to the majority of Nigerians needed to be removed largely because of corrupt practices. Indeed, he was toppled in a coup d'etat (Babawale, 1999). Before the fall of the regime, however, he was indifferent to several national issues like the 1973 census, the creation of states, and demilitarization of the Nigerian political system, and the promise to effect changes on the military governors including the reckless abandon with which the state administrators exhibited their powers only helped to erode more out of Gowon's fragile basis of legitimacy, in these years (Elaigwu, 1979).

The immediate cause which led to the removal of Lt. Col. Gowon as the Head of State in Nigeria was the pronouncement that the 1976 handover date is no longer sacrosanct or attainable prompted another coup to save the country "from their lethargy" (Elaigwu, 1979:179). The administration headed by Murtala Muhammed embarked on the reorganization of the polity with 10 out of Gowon's 12 Military Governors guilty of corruption. Several public officers were compulsorily retired and a program for return to civil rule was initiated (Babawale, 1998).

The assassination of Murtala Mohammed on 13th February 1976 did not end the administration of the quest for the democratization of the country. General Olusegun Obasanjo who was Murtala's Chief of Staff continued the transition program with the Constitution Drafting Committee with the creation of six additional states and local governments including the introduction of "an executive presidential system of government" (Oyediran, 2007:48). The regime approved six political parties that contested the 1979 general elections. The introduction of the presidential system of government "the post of president of Nigeria is perhaps the most prestigious and desirable in all Africa" is perhaps makes politics to be a do-or-die affair in the country. This marked the beginning of the Second Republic of Nigeria with all attributes of democratic government, viz: rule of law, constitutional government, democratic institutions legislature, judiciary, executive emphasizing checks and balances.

The NPN as well as its government dominated the political scene and armed itself with the provision of shelter food and qualitative education for the people. The disposition of the party was not to the people per se but their pockets, "given the propensity of its members to loot and their commitment to reckless spending, the party could not even undertake the minimum of positive changes; contrary to its promises, there were neither food, shelter nor qualitative education, … the NPN which controlled the federal government throughout the … gave neither economic nor political development but huge debts, intensified dependence on foreign powers, inflation, hunger, misery and unemployment and underdevelopment (Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985). And the attitudes of the party leaders were not necessarily to contribute and

provide dividends of democracy and national development "the politicians represented nobody but themselves". In other words, they did not represent the aspiration of the electorate of Nigerians who saddled them with the responsibility of quality representation and protection of their interests in governance. As Falola and Ihonvbere (1985:49) put it "political representation became nothing short of a passport to accumulation". In particular, the NPN government consolidated and strengthened its government through the placation of opposition parties and as well lay emphasis on the distribution of offices rather than concentration and solve governance crisis in the country, but acted within the interests of few Nigerian politicians including its prominent party members. There was no coordination between the ruling parties and the opposition in governance. The opposition parties were victimized because the NPN government unleash and organized acts of violence and lawlessness, even systematically attempted to rule in the states where the NPN lost elections; widespread killings. Falola and Ihonvbere (1985), Joseph (1999) argue that all the political parties that won elections in the states including the NPN government at the national level performed very poorly and dissipated their energy to pursue selfish ends, class-based interests, propaganda, political victimization within and outside its party to embezzle public funds.

There was an expectation on the side of the people that what had hitherto eluded them in terms of a minimum standard of living would be compensated through the people's elected representatives. Alas, after four years, the governance deficit remains what they were and in fact, the administration had contributed more to the crisis of governance than what it inherited from the previous administrations since independence in 1960. The regime to regic governance, particularly economy, while presenting to the NASS the national budget in December 1983 notified the peoples' assembly that the administration would be willing to introduce the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) to resolve the national economic crisis. Under him, the implementation of SAP remained colossal. The regime was characterized by unprecedented corruption (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2015; Ogunwa, 2015). An observer of the administration of Shagari says that the government planted and harvested rice on national television. Political largesse in the forms of contracts was awarded to the friends, families of the government. These

factors influenced the military-led by Muhammadu Buhari to take over from him in 1983. His administration was short but eventful and known for the War Against Indiscipline, although removed in a palace coup staged by General Ibrahim Gbadamosi Babangida on August 27, 1985. We have argued that the socio-political crises between 1960 and 1965 in Nigeria culminated in military rule. Some related crises like corruption, mismanagement, indecision both the governments of Aguiyi Ironsi, Yakubu Gowon's inconsistencies in governance after nine years of unclear vision and mission for Nigeria. Both the Balewa led government at the federal level in 1964. The purported regimes of Ironsi and Gowon were not different in the art of misgovernance, because they were deeply involved in the mismanagement of national resources. The Second Republic exhibited these characteristics of embezzlement and moribundness as far as moving the country forward is concerned.

The coup of 1983 can be justified to have ousted the Shagari's government on 31st December 1983. As usual, according to Babawale (1999:107) "Nigerians hewed a sigh of relief when on December 31, 1983, they were alerted to the news of the overthrow of the Shagari administration". The new regime headed by Major General Muhammadu Buhari enjoyed a great deal of support from Nigerians internally and internationally. The coupists accused the Shagari administration of corruption, inefficiency, maladministration, indiscipline, mismanagement of the economy, funds, electoral rigging, drug trafficking, and the attendant political violence that traded the 1983 general elections.

The regime could not, however, solve the problems inherited from the government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari, because:
For both ailments, they provided the wrong remedies. Although corrupt politicians were all thrown into detention, the retrenchment of workers and the promulgation of draconian decrees like Decree 2, 3, 4, 7, and 20 did not go down well with the public. The slightest offenses carried death penalties and the newspapers were restricted by a decree (No. 4) in their publications. The National Students Association (NANS) and the Airline Pilots and Flight Engineers Association (APFEAN) were banned from raising the slightest voices of dissent. The administration began to grow progressive fascistic. It treated Nigerians like prisoners

in their own country or like wild school children who needed doses of War Against Indiscipline (WAI) to be properly tamed (Babawale, 1999:107108).

Despite the autocratic nature of the regime, the country enjoyed law and order, and decency in the social behavior of the people. Dahiru (2007:121) argues the autocratic rule of the regime lies in the fact that overnight Nigerians complied and turned a new leaf. When government policies were formulated, they were implemented to the letter. As it was being announced, it was already affecting the citizenry.

The regime introduced discipline into the culture of Nigeria, this was however not appreciated by its own cabinet, that is, the military administrators, federal ministers, and few selected Nigerians. Nwankwo (1991:21):
It is symptomatic of collective guilt, therefore that neither the oppressive nor the oppressed sector of Nigerian society is capable of confronting the nation's numerous problems with a bold affirmation of purpose and will to action. While the elites, revered in their squalid wealth embark upon actions that prop the continuity of the system, the people, having swallowed disproportionate doses of oppressor consciousness, fail to identify, grapple with and confront the national roots of their minimal existence. Even within the circle of the elites who consider ethnic groups exclusiveness as the primary bane of Nigerian politics, the elites who consider themselves hurt and marginalized, are not ready to take up the challenge of calling their erring compatriots to order. But because they merely aim at displacing the junta and to exercise the power of the state in the same segregation character of that junta, their world view and cohesive consciousness do not go beyond the traditional matrix of federal character, the quota system, revenue allocation, and the politicization of demography. Also, because the people have refused to be used, the ethnic credo of the elite is allowed to color the perspective of the populace. The nation fails to surge forward because no one is in a position or willing to act.

Enefe (2008:99) says:
This regime under discussion set as its main objective calling Nigerians to order through a war against indiscipline but simply because the

acquisition of leadership position was just for mere material satisfaction when junta struck, the first thing was to give the supposed government 'National Character' by using 'Quota System' as a guide for representation in the name of ethnic balancing while the ethnic groups became automatically the 'diehard' supporters of the regime, remaining as poor as ever.

Because the foundation of was laid on political injustice:
The architecture of the Nigerian state was originally designed to fail, and the misfortune of the last and this generation is that no particular class, ethnic group, or religious sect has done enough to prevent a collapse. Every segment of society has tended to subserve to the obsolete philosophy of the inevitability of instability and feature. While that complacent elite regard the current process as "systematic and enveloping" or indulge in the "nostalgia of yesteryears when the country, in their view, was calm and placid" other less privilege "excuse any and every lapse on their part with a shrug that after all, we are all Nigerians. Inevitably the people watch helpless and hopelessly as they are being exploited and cannibalized by the elites despite the enormous scale of failure scored by the leadership. The victims of such misgovernance remain torpid in their consciousness and they are unwilling or incapable of taking action in favor of a coherent system of choice in politics and economics presided over by leadership that would take the country as a whole as its constituency rather than regarding themselves merely as the canonical representatives of a section or group with the country (Nwankwo, 1991:21).

This coup terminated the Buhari Regime. It was headed by a selfstyle-imposed Military President and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Force of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, General Ibrahim Babangida. In his national broadcast to the Nigerian people, Babangida said, "Major-General Buhari was too rigid and uncompromising in his attitude to issues of national significance" (FRCN Network, August 27, 1985). The new government:
From inception, it was apparent realities well in advance and accordingly worked on the psychology of Nigerians effectively. The regime combined liberal democracy and military dictatorship, which left Nigerians elevated and disarmed. In fact, for a nation that had just been

"liberated" from the grips of twenty (20) months "reign of terror" by a draconian dictatorship, such in genius trick was too much for a trap" (Enefe, 2008: 105).

The regime has the intention to "establish a viable and enduring people-oriented political system devoid of perennial disruption". According to Akinboye and Anifowose (2008:251) "on the assumption of power, Babangida's first task was to abrogate some of the draconian decrees and set the victims free. He also pledged to respect human rights and disengage the military from governance. He set the machinery in motion to produce a new constitution for the Third Republic". The administration inaugurated 117-member Committee to serve as members of the Political Bureau to identify a basic philosophy of government which will determine goals and serves as a guide to the activities of government; to gather, collate and evaluate the contributions of Nigerians to the search for a viable political future and provide guidelines for the attainment of the consensus objectives; and finally to debate on the other political problems as may be referred to it from time to time. The Political Bureau recommended the following: the creation of two (2) party system; the creation of a National Directorate of Social Mobilization for political education; a socialist socio-economic system to be at the commanding height of the Nigerian economy; a presidential system as the best system of government for Nigeria; creation of two more states in the federation i.e. Akwa Ibom from Cross River State and Katsina from Kaduna state; traditional rulers should be confined to the local government areas within their communities and not be granted any specific legislative, executive or judicial functions; the reorganization of the military's future role and their disengagement from politics; conduct of a national census and the establishment of a permanent body to constantly study the issues of revenue allocation and make appropriate recommendations; the use of the principles of federal character as a solution to the problem of agitation by minorities; that each local government in the federation be allocated one federal legislative seats; that 5% of the legislative seats be allocated to Nigerian women and to labour; nationalization of the entire oil industry by the government, etc (Enefe, 2008). The regime accepted only the areas it considered important namely: the democratization of power, adoption of a presidential system of government, traditional

rulers' confinement, adoption of a two-party system, military disengagement, resensitization of Nigerian citizens among others. The regime established the National Electoral Commission headed by Professor Eme Awa with the responsibility to organize and conduct the election and other electoral matters throughout the country. The Constituency Assembly submitted the draft constitution to the Armed Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) which after some modifications and later promulgated the new Constitution on May 3, 1989 (Akinboye and Anifowose, 2008: 252). The administration also created two additional states following the recommendation of the Political Bureau on the 23rd of September, 1987. The states were: Akwa Ibom and Katsina states. Also, on August 27, 1991. Babangida announced the creation of another nine (9) states namely: Abia, Delta, Enugu, Jigawa, Kebbi, Kogi, Osun, Taraba, and Yobe with over 200 local government areas. Thus, the Babangida government did transform Nigeria's federation into 30 states and about 500 local governments' areas (Enefe, 2008:110). Two political parties: the Social Democratic Party (SDP) and the National Republican Convention (NRC) were decreed on the Nigerian State because none of the political associations has satisfied NEC's guidelines for political party registration (Enefe, 2008). His nine years' transition program culminated in the annulment of the presidential election seen as the best in the political history of Nigeria because the election was a "departure from the past troubled and turbulent electoral history which had favored a particular section of the country" (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2008:253). The annulment, however, turned some parts of the country into pandemonium and generated intense ethnic, populist, and regional antipathy that led to the political actor himself, Babangida to 'step aside'" (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2008:118).

The impact of the Babangida regime in Nigeria politics show that the administration was aware of many issues confronting the country and the people at large "to put the record straight, the Babangida regime seemed to show greater awareness of the depth and complexity of Nigeria's problems and attempted to proffer practical solutions, but failed to pursue them with sincerity of purpose, commitment and determination required for such patriotic undertakings" (Enefe, 2008). The creation of specialized agencies like MAMSER, DIFFIRI to solve the problem of unemployment, rural development, student unrest, and

educate rural farmers and small, medium and large scale industries among others were indeed in the true spirit of national development.

Like the other military rule, the IBB government was out to correct misgovernance, the hopes of Nigerians were dashed owing to political manipulation, corruption, fraud, lack of probity and accountability, etc. The politics of the regime has been described as the "transition without end" (Oyediran), which for eight years of experimenting democracy in Nigeria and playing on the psyche of Nigerians with the decreed two parties, but unfortunately, the constitution was merely promulgated and operated piece-meal. It did not wholly come into operation due to the lack of full democratic governance in the country. While civilians operated as governors at the state level, and national and state legislatures existed in a vacuum (since they were powerless), the military held on to power at the federal level. It was indeed a marriage of inconvenience. Little wonder that the Third Republic bee ill-fated. To cap it all, the government of General Babangida annulled the results of June 12, 1993, a presidential election which would have ushered in a properly constituted democratic government in the country" (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2008:252). The "step aside" of General I. Babangida on August 26, 1993, and establishment of the Interim National Government (ING) headed by Chief Ernest Shonekan, and the appointment of General Sani Abacha as the ING's Minister of Defense. General S. Abacha used his vintage position to remove Chief Shonekan in a palace coup of November 17. On the assumption of the presidency, the regime banned all political gatherings including all democratic institutions as well as sacked all elected representatives; the state governors, state and national lawmakers, and the elected local government officials. In his first broadcast speech to Nigerian people, Abacha said:

Fellow Nigerians, sequel to the resignation of the former Head of the Interim National Government and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces, Chief Ernest Shonekan, and my subsequent selfappointed or appointment as Head of State and Commander-inChief, I have had extensive consultations within the Armed Forces hierarchy and other well-meaning Nigerians in a bid to find the solution to the various political, economic and social problems which have engulfed our beloved country and which have made life most difficult to the ordinary citizens of this … Many have expressed fear about the apparent return of the military. Many have talked about the concern of the international

community. However, under the present circumstances, the survival of our beloved country is far above and other considerations. Nigeria is the only country we have. We must therefore solve our problems ourselves. We must lay a very solid foundation for the growth of a true democracy … The problems must be addressed firmly, objectively, decisively and with all sincerity of purpose (quoted in Enefe, 2008:133-134) emphasis mine.

The regime indeed was a continuation of General I. Babangida with the following pronouncement: the Interim National Government National and State Assemblies, the state executive council dissolved, local government councils, the National Electoral Commission, all former secretaries to the federal ministries, the two parties (SDP and NRC); all processions, political meetings, and associations of any type in any part of the country banned; any consultative committee by whatever name called stood proscribed, while decree 61 of 1993 was abrogated. To Nigerians and the International community, the regime says:

This regime will be firm, humane, and decisive. We will not condone nor tolerate any act of indiscipline. Any attempt to test our will be decisively dealt with. For the international community, we ask that you suspend judgment while we grapple with the onerous task of national building, reconciliation, and repairs. This government is a child of necessity with a strong determination to restore peace and stability in our country, and on these foundations, enthrone a lasting democracy. Give us the chance to solve our problems in our own ways.

The government of Abacha inaugurated the National Constitutional Conference on June 27, 1994: "our nearly twenty-four years of sovereign existence have been be-set with a history of continuous political uncertainties. We have had a crisis of legitimacy, a crisis of succession, a crisis of authority, and a crisis of nationally acceptable leadership. Our country is today resolved to terminate the vicious cycle of crisis" (See Draft Constitution, 1995:xi). The recommendations of the conference included: the division of Nigeria into sex zones for power-sharing at the federal level, the rotation office of the President, Vice-president, Prime Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Senate president, and Speaker of the House of Representatives, and application of the Federal Character Commission.

The transition program was designed for a "self-succession project otherwise stylishly referred to as a "civilianization" political mutation through the change of regalia from khaki to "Agbada" (Enefe, 2008:138). To realize this objective, the government arrested and killed leading politicians including Mrs. Kudirat Abiola, Chief Ayo Adebanjo, Chief Cornelius Adebayo, Professor Olusola Adeyeye, among others. (Aluko, 1998). The incarceration of General Olusegun Obasanjo and the late General Shehu Musa Yar'Adua, the dethronement of the then Sultan of Sokoto, Alhaji Ibrahim Dasuki and the execution of the likes Ken Saro Wiwa and eight other environmental activities". Also, the regime arrested former Military Head of State, Olusegun Obasanjo, his Chief of General Staff, Lt. General Oladipo Diya and five others "for allegedly plotting to overthrow the Abacha government" (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2008:256).

The registered five political parties are well described by Chief Bola Ige as being the "five fingers of a leprous hand". Little wonder that these five political parties, UNCP, NCPN, CNC, DPN, and GDM at their various conventions adopted the General (Abacha) as their presidential candidate for the presidential election slated for 1998. The international community severed political and economic relationship with the Nigerian state and imposed all manners of sanctions on the Abacha regime. Nigeria was regarded as a pariah state and was isolated from the international community. In his address at the NIIA in December 1997, Abacha said that:

The overriding aim of Nigeria's foreign policy must be to protect and safeguard our national interest at all times. Against the background of our experience, the main thrust of our foreign policy is the alleviation of poverty and the pursuit of self-reliant development. In response to the challenges of the emerging globalization of the international system and in expressing our right to self-determination, we have in recent times, been looking beyond our traditional allies, to diversify and cultivate new ties with countries that we consider not only friendly but display honest desire to cooperate with us in pursuit of our development objectifies. We would always welcome genuine and friendly relations based on mutual trust and equality (quoted in Enefe, 2008:139).

Amid foreign and internal opposition Abacha might have achieved his political ambition save he has not died on June 8, 1998 (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2008). The same argument was put forward by Enefe that "dramatically and suddenly, on June 8, 1998, General Abacha died under questionable, controversial, and unexpected circumstances attributed to divine intervention" (2008: 140). Thus, the end of "… onerous tasks of nation-building, reconciliation, and repairs… enthrone a lasting democracy …" for the Nigerian state came to a brutal climax while expecting a new messiah to bankroll once again many troubles of the country. The last military administration before the democratic dispensation in 1999 is seen as "opportunism and political appeasement". This regime came on board as a result of the death of General Sani Abacha tagged "the maximum ruler" on June 7, 1998. In the words of Akpan:

Fortunately, or otherwise, General Abdusalami Abubakar assumes the leadership of this country at a time of grave national exigency and expectations, a time which demands a large-hearted leader with super-human strength to bear the avalanche of problems of years of political inertia without wavering, deliver the good and leave the stage when the oration is loudest; that is why the General should be pitied rather than congratulated" (quoted in Enefe, 2008:144). Like all the previous Heads of State, General Abubakar addressed the nation as follows:

Like other Nigerians, I received the sad news (of the death of late General Abacha) with great shock, and in accepting the burden of history now placed upon me as Head of State, I pray that Almighty God will give us the fortitude to bear this irreparable loss. … Fellow Nigerians, we remain fully committed to the socio-political transition program of General Sani Abacha's administration will do everything to ensure its full and successful implementation (quoted in Enefe, 2008:145).

He announced a ten-month transition program which was to be implemented between August 1998 and May 1999 (Onuoha & Fadakinte (2002). The highlights of the transition program included: a reinstruction of common conditions for new political parties; the cancellation of previous elections of Abacha transition and posts held as a result of those elections e.g. local government chairmen, members of the state house of assembly, federal house of assembly and the senate;

the dissolution of the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON) to be replaced later with the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC); Abubakar transition was to terminate with the hand-over of political power on May 29, 1999. All political detainees except Chief M. K. O. Abiola the presumed winner of the 1993 presidential election were released. The government promulgated the transition Decrees. They included: Decree No. 34 (1989) caped "transition to Civil Rule (political program); Decree No. 35 (1998) caped "Political "parties Registration"; Decree No. 36 (1998) caped Local Government Transitional and Constitutional Provisions; Decree No. 3 (1999) caped "State Government Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions"; Decree No. 5 (1999) caped National Assembly Basic Constitutional and Transitional Provisions; Decree No. 24 (1999) caped the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. The promulgation of these decrees showed that the seriousness of General Abubakar's commitment to the transition program, and his determination to hand over to the democratically elected president come May 29, 1999. The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) was established on 6 August 1998 headed by Justice Ephraim Akpata with the responsibility to register political parties, to register intending voters, and to monitor elections in the country. With the political ban on party politics lifted, associations spring up to become political parties. The INEC registered three political parties namely: the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP); All Peoples Party (APP) and the Alliance for Democracy (AD).

The PDP was victorious in the presidential election, and on 29 May 1999, General Abdusalam Abubakar handed the reign of political power to Chief Olusegun Obasanjo at the Eagle Square, Abuja. Thus, this ended the 16 years of Military adventure since the Second Republic was terminated in 1983. Nigeria became a new nation and democratic with the constitutional form of governance restored including freedom, equality, liberty, equalitarianism in the body polity.

However, the regime was enmeshed in corruption and looting of the treasury "World Bank and IMF officials released figures, reported on 11th April 1999 which maintained that in the first quarter of 1999 when Abdulsalam was in office, the country's external reserve had dropped

drastically from US$7.1 billion in December 1998 to $4.2 billion by the end of March 1999 (Enefe, 2008). Similarly, the death of Chief M. K. O. Abiola during the Abubakar regime remains at large. The military rule in Nigeria, Momoh (2015) observes, more than 70% of Nigerians live in poverty; life expectancy is 54 years; infant mortality and maternal mortality were 77 per 1,000 and 704 per 100,000 respectively; only about 10% of the population had access to essentials drugs; fewer than 30 physicians per 100,000 people; 5 million adults living with HIV/AIDS; among children under 5, almost 30% were underweight; only 17% of children were fully immunized; the 1999 UN Human Development Index placed Nigeria 146th in a survey of 174; only about half the population had access to drinking water (40% in rural areas, 80% in urban areas); some 29% of the total population lived at risk of annual floods; more than 90% of the rural population depended on forests for livelihood and domestic energy sources; rural households spent an average of 1.5 hours a day collecting water and fuelwood, walking an average of one kilometer a day to collect water and fuelwood. Adebayo views the legacy of military governance as much more complex than imagined. Arguing that Nigeria's political well-being will for some years be haunted by the state of its economic crisis and that "unless immediate corrective measures are taken to arrest and reverse the steep downwards slope" (quoted in Obadina, 1999:8). Little wonder, Osumah and Ikelegbe (2009:185) see military government as a disaster because "government became a weapon of punishment, harassment, impoverishment, oppression, and intimidation".

For more than two decades of civil rule, political actors conveniently play politics along and reproduced ethnicity as a political ideology and an instrument of mobilization of national and made poly-ethnic federation the key issue for public policy. The ruling class and indeed the politicians used political parties and party systems to maintain their grip on political power, and unconstitutionally (Agbaje, 2010; Sklar, 2004). Yusuf (2015) posits that the struggle for political power has created unnecessary competitions and conflicts between political parties at the level of the electoral process. According to him, Nigerian politicians deliberately created an electoral crisis that has endured for decades which only benefit a fraction of the political class that desire not to relinquish the status quo but retain, dominate and further

consolidate the system to be answerable to their interests, and undemocratic elections which exclusively is dictatorial, corrupt, predatory and unresponsive to the needs and yearning of the citizens "a non-participatory political set up, the outcome is the outcome of governance that falls short of the expectations and expectations and needs of the majority of the citizenry" (Yusuf, 2015:23). The conduct of elections is a negation of all known democratic tenets, elections were characterized by electoral malpractices, mismanagement, irregularities, falsification of election results, poor election management. This swelled series of electoral crises and violence and ineffective governance in the federation. The welfare of the citizenry becomes a secondary affair since "a state (Nigerian state) be better destroyed if they are out of political power". Osumah and Ikelegbe (2009:198) submit that politics and governance in the country have created mass disillusionment and discontent with the government. Arguing, more than ever the people are alienated from the government largely because it has a "decline in capacity, legitimacy, and relevance in promoting genuine development, security among the teeming populace".

Saliu and Muhammed (n.d) put it that the need to capture power, by all means, underlies parties' behaviors directed toward personal interests. Governance is exchanged for politics as a means to acquire power and wealth. Maduekwe (2005) observation of politicians "playing by the rules becomes uncomfortable with democratic principles" because politicians only respond to their social, political, and economic impulses. Arguing that politics in Nigeria and of course party activities are characterized by behavioral tendencies manifesting in inter and intraparty antagonism, indiscipline and flagrant violation of party rules; factionalism and lack of internal cohesion, ideological emptiness of parties, and dwindling hope of party institutionalization among others.

Idowu (2013) argues that the rivalries and lack of trust among the Nigerian politicians impelled the course of national development across the federation because they held on to the state decides who owns what and does not and consequently affected the pace and process of socio-economic and political development as well as improvement in the living standard of people. A former National Chairman of PDP, Chief Audu Ogbeh laments that "…the weakest area which seems to have obliterated all these achievements is the economy. The cost of living is

very high, unemployment is rising, food supply is inadequate, we are too dependent on imports, the national budget is too small, and all the statements we made talking of diversifying the base of the economy have yielded nothing. As result young graduates can't find jobs, the crime rate can never go down and people are generally not happy…" (Ogbeh, 2002:15). The phenomena in the land such as the Niger-Delta Militancy, the Northeast Boko Haram terrorism, the Northcentral unrest which appears to be more political than sectarian precedence of the destruction of innocent lives and property, displacement, kidnapping across the country.

Lewis's (2011:7) observation is instructive "Nigeria has pursued stability while contending with weakness. … At the same time, the country confronts basic problems of governance, social peace, and development that pose risks of crisis". The crises in the country are overshadowed by basic institutional deficiencies, social violence, and economic vulnerability. Core elements of the fledgling democratic system including electoral machinery, political parties, and the legislature have fostered political oligarchy rather than a responsive government. The absence of the responsible government particularly in the Fourth Republic has led to "poor governance and the zero-sum nature of Nigerian politics remain the country's most important catalysts of instability" (Lewis, 2011:1). The political crisis has remained prominent in body politics which put governance in abeyance. In fact, at the center of governance, the quest for power and national resources was the pre-occupation of Nigerian politicians. According to Ake (2001:6), Nigerian elites struggled and used the state resources for accumulation to "strengthen their material base". Williams (1976) says politics affords the politicians the "opportunity to acquire wealth and prestige, to be able to distribute benefits in the form of goods, contracts, scholarships, and gifts of money and so on to one's relatives and political allies". The attitude of the political class to politics "… the ethics of business penetrated politics, the ethics of politics penetrated the business, the ethics of the gangster penetrated both" (Williams, 1980:47). The political environment became hostile for national growth and development. Indeed, Dudley (1968:297) has remarked that the slogan of the time was "East for the Easterners, West for the Westerns, North for Northerners and Nigeria for nobody".

Nigeria and Revolution

Since the creation of the Nigerian state in 1900 particularly the attainment of political independence in 1960, the country is currently celebrating six decades of statehood. Yet, misgovernance or "bad governance" remains at large. The intervention by the Nigerian military was to put an end to bad governance. We cannot but appreciate the military for the tokenism provided for 29 years for being able to hold the country and Nigerians together after the terrible federal election in 1964 as well as the 1983 general election and the annulment of the 1913 presidential election. The military on several occasions promised to correct the socio-economic and political malignant before returning power to the civil authority. The economic policies enacted have not repositioned the country economically. For instance, the introduction and implementation of the Structural Adjustment Program (SAP) has been a colossal one. Besides, the SAP, other economic programs such as the Better Life for Rural Women, the Family Support Programme (FSP), and the Family Economic and Advancement Programme (FEAP) program among others instituted by the various wives of former Heads of State lasted within the tenure of their husbands. Largely, the economic program such as the Directorate of Foods, Road and Rural Infrastructure (DIFRRI), the National Directorate of Employment (NDE), MAMSER initiated by the Babangida administration died with the regime. Additionally, the transition programs failed to produce a solid foundation for democratic government. The "transition without end" is only bequeathed on the nation, politicians who have been accused of corrupt practices. The banning and unbanning of politicians by the military regime by Babangida are those found in the corridors of power (Agbaje, 2010; Omoruyi, 2002). Thus, the political parties and the party system only represent the political personalities, ethnicity, political bigotry, and ideological emptiness. With the 36 states and the 774 local governments created by the various military governments between 1966-1979 and 1988-1995, these creations have increased the problems of governance since some of these states still subsist at the mercy of the federal government. The introduction of the federal character or quota system for equality and representation of all at the federal agencies has not settled the question of inclusion and participation of all Nigerians including the minority groups.
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Like the military rule, the civil rule from 1960-1966 and 19791983, these two governments were known for electoral violence, intolerant of opposition, the rigging of elections. The governments deployed state agencies to rig elections, for instance, the 1964 and 1965 elections. Additionally, in 1983 the election which was supposed to be a consolidation of 1979 elections were massively rigged by the NPN ruling government through the electoral umpire as well as the Inspector General of Police, Sunday Adewusi (Joseph, 1999; Falola & Ihonvbere, 1985). Although the NPN was declared the winner of the election, the government suffered from an illegitimate crisis because the party used the apparatus of the state to return itself to the state. What followed was political assassination and elimination, arson, and pogrom of innocent Nigerians. Besides, the government was enmeshed in corrupt practices (Akinboye & Anifowose, 2015).

After 16 years of military rule, on May 29, 1999, the military returned power to the elected civilians. Since then and now, that is, 1999-2020, the few politicians elected and appointed to paddle the governance not only show their disregard to democratic governance but have added to the crisis of governance. The attitudes of politicians to governance are still the same. They have not yielded and submitted to liberal democratic values. The party system lacked ideological positions on good governance. Politics has taken the place of governance. For them, the Nigerian state is better destroyed than their investment in politics wasted. Among the elected and appointed, corruption still at large and cut across the government officials, agencies of governments, uncompleted projects abound hunger and massive unemployment. Also, there is an absence of accommodation, electricity is a night mere coupled with bad roads, high cost of food, insecurity, insurgents, and kidnapping across the country.

Nigerians have trooped out in their large numbers to denounce bad governance from the state officials but just as in the days of colonialism and military rule, their peaceful protests were suppressed, arrested, and murdered by the State Armed Forces including the Nigerian Police, DSS, and other state apparatus. The blood of Nigerians littered the streets across the federation.

From the above, both the military rule and civil rule have not only created an atmosphere capable of instigating another military rule or first-time revolution because there are enough factors capable of causing a reordering of governance in the country. In other countries like France, Russia, Argentina, Portugal, Egypt, Cuba, and several others where the change of government has forcefully taken place, the causes are not different from what has been witnessed since the creation of the Nigerian state particularly in the last two decades of democratic governance. For instance, the builtup to France's revolution was that the average Frenchmen and women were displeased with the Constitution to build around the monarchy as well as the financial crisis and the notable in Assembly (Wilde, 2012). Amid these two problems, the king and his government forced laws on the people through the arbitrary practice of lit de justice without response to many complaints brought to him and quoted as saying "it's legal because I wish it" (Doyle, 2002:80). This statement furthered the constitutional crisis, as well as France, bankrupts "the treasury was empty and no one was willing to accept loans or changes".

In Nigeria, the calls for geopolitical restructuring under the military regimes and the democratic civil rule have produced different constitutions like 1979; 1989; 1995; and 1999. These constitutions only reproduced one version of another. The 1979 constitution, for example, only changed the feature of the Nigerian government from the Westminster that is, the Parliamentary system to that of the Presidential system, a prototype of the American system of government. Similarly, the 1995 Abacha's Constitution (although not practice) introduced six geopolitical systems, while the 1999 Constitution only consolidated the 1995 constitution. In all these constitutions, the makers only affected patch-holes to suit the urgent demands. In other words, they have not addressed the challenges of governance holistically in the country. Again, a look at these constitutions particularly that of 1999, the state and local governments in the North are more than that of the south combined. According to Mills (1976:141) in a federal system:

The Nigerian Senate and the House of Representatives have not made a holistic amendment to the constitution to reflect the needs of Nigerians. The 1999 Constitution contained several contradictions. Ikponmwen

(2020:21) "General Abdulsalami Abubakar tinkered with the work of the constitutional conference and panel-beat same beyond recognition" (quoted in Sunday Telegraph, October 18, 2020:21). The government's efforts to restructure the polity lacked political will even though there were two constitutional conferences organized in 2005 and 2014 to reposition the country. The recommendations of the two conferences were not implemented by the PDP government with the billions of Naira expended on them.

With the estimated population of Nigeria put above 200 million, while an average Nigerian is now enlightened especially the youths. Year in and year out, the tertiary institutions including the universities, colleges, polytechnics have turned out graduates that flooded the streets without a job to do. In 2020, precisely in October, the youths across the country in their large number flooded the major highways with placards denouncing the brutality of the police and bad governance. They carried on their various placards "end to bad governance", "#endsars", "#endassu strike" among others. The protests and demonstrations led to many deaths and brutalities. For instance, at the Lekki Toll Gate in Lagos State, the peaceful protesters with the National Flag colored "Green, White and Green" were shot dead by their own Nigerian army after the Flood Light and the Security Camera were switched put out (The Guardian, Wednesday, 21, 2020; the Punch, Wednesday, 21, 2020). What followed the killing of the youth was the destruction of government and private properties. The Nigerian government had earlier recruited and armed several thugs to unleash violence on the peaceful protesters across Nigeria particularly in Abuja and Lagos (The Punch, October 20, 2020). In 2012, Nigerians were shot when they protected against the increase in fuel pump price (Ogunwa, 2012). The killing of Nigerians by the military and the Police also occurred in 1993 and 1994 when Nigerians in their millions protested against the annulment of the presidential election termed to be free and fair in 1993.

The discovery of oil in commercial quantity increased the revenue of the federal government since the 1960s. The huge income to the government, the Gowon regime to informed the world that the problem of Nigeria is not the money per se, but how to spend it. From the 1980s, the country has been bankrupt and borrowed money from financial institutions across the world to finance the national budgets,

infrastructural development across Nigeria. The debt forgiveness by global institutions in 2005 has not reflected the lives of the people socially and economically. A large percent of Nigeria's budget is expended on the few elected and appointed public officials, while the majority of the people are experiencing starvation including famine, high cost of goods. Nigerians pay to enjoy energy being supplied by the government. They bought the Transformers, cables, pools and pay for workmanship before electricity is connected to their homes and businesses. Yet, they are still charged with estimated billings and pay for what they did not use. Sixty years after, the Nigerian farmers still use old farm tools such as cutlasses and hoes that impeded crop production in large quantities. The little crops available in the Nigerian markets are very expensive to buy. Nigerian government exports her crude oil and buys refined products at a very expensive price. The French Revolution was triggered by hunger, destitution, disaffection, corruption, and the cry for "bread" (Kaplan, 1982; Grove, 1998; Wood, 1975). These problems effectively put justice out of the reach of all Nigerians except the wealthy ones. Put this way, the tax has been imposed on the majority of Nigerians without representation. The question of the growing gap between the rich and poor increases the question of inequality as a time bomb to be detonated.

Conclusions and Way Forward

The attempt to change a bad government through constitutional means had proved abortive, because the government of the day used all the state apparatuses to remain in power, and silence political opposition in a bid to reign perpetually. Such attempt to resists change by the government is through one-party ideology, socialism, or communism that accelerate political insurgents, demonstrations, revolts, coup d'états, and other forms of unrest to ensure that the regime is overthrow either by the whole population or few of them. The attempt to capture power from the seating government by the few is regarded as a coup d'etat. If the coupists succeed, it only achieves the political transition from a dictator to another. The change in government is only at the top. The new government may embark on reform that goes into policy formulations, and implementations. On the other hand, when the whole population engages a seating government to overthrow it, this is called a revolution. If the revolutionists succeed, they sweep old orders including all its segments away. Thus, the effect of such a revolution will cut across

political, economic, social, cultural, even the external environment will feel the effect. New policies are to replace old policies including the minds, behaviors, actions of both the rulers, ruled and external environment would change towards the new dawn, which the revolutionary movement had promised during recruitment days. Where revolutions have succeeded, it usually leads to several consequences including economic, social, cultural, foreign relations, deaths, isolations, and so on.

Revolutions have changed and will continue to change modern societies as long as citizens' desires change and the ruling government continues to be intransigent at reform pleasing the majority in the society. The take-over of a government through a revolution or coup d'état is not an easy enterprise. Neither is there any need to wrestle political power forcefully from the incumbent rulers through violence. Certain circumstances usually lead to such a decision by overzealous, conscious, and militant individuals to organize a group and ensure that intransigent rulers are removed from office. Such that the new (rulers) government provide the necessity for citizens in the state, which the former rulers had failed to provide.

Revolution is meaningful if it succeeds and able to effect necessary changes fundamentally in body politics. To those who experienced it, it is of many blessings since it has made significant changes and redirected, redesigned the style of governance in its entirety. Like the French revolution that produced three cardinal philosophies liberty, equality, and fraternity. This philosophy had endured since that time and now, and in fact, it has become a policy on which numerous governments heavily relied upon including their citizens. For instance, the United States of America after the revolution was able to inculcate equality of all citizens including the slaves, "that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights that among these are Life, Liberty, and the pursuit of Happiness" (Ebenstein, 1954:132).

Indeed, happiness becomes those countries and citizens that have changed their societies with inculcation of free will, social rights, and political rights, economic and cultural rights. All these are products of

revolutions and enjoyed by people and they see them as part and parcel of the new dawn. While it is not easy for a country that had once been devastated by the political upheaval to rebuild and reconstruct the society, yet, the aftermaths of the revolutions are worthwhile to celebrate a new dawn, new philosophy, new ideology that hinge on the constitution and constitutional government where various rights are articulated and aggregated and documented both for the rulers and ruled. No government would wish to engage any group within society in a battle of supremacy leading to the bloodbath, civil war, destruction of life, and property. To ensure that the national governments resolve their internal differences, and avoid civil war, guerilla warfare, starvation, arson, terror, violence, and political exile. Various national governments must attend to the following:

Constitutional Government
The modern states operate on the citizens made constitutions accepted and by the rulers and ruled. A constitution must be presented to the people at its time of enactment. If the constitution is accepted, it becomes the national document that is sacrosanct and where the ruler and ruled derives their power, basic functions, and other obligations. A ruling government should not amend the constitution while in power. Doing so will mean that the government is elongating its tenure. Several African leaders while in power altered the constitutions which elongated their tenure of office. For instance, in Africa countries, some presidents used the state apparatus/power to ensure unconstitutional elongation.

The consequence of this, however, these leaders created unnecessary political tension that led to affordable civil wars, political pogrom, unstable economy, political instability, strife, and fear. The neighboring countries, and the world at large share in these problems and the formation of regional and world organizations to send peace-keeping missions to ameliorate peace between the government forces and the rebels. In addition to the Military personnel, humanitarian organizations like Red Cross are sent to take care of those that have been hit by bullets, poverty, etc. Sometimes the military personnel and humanitarian organizations lost their lives including journalists covering the crisis.

Democracy
The word democracy means the majority has their way, the minority has their say. The modern government now operates on the idea of people's government. People's government incorporates liberty, equality, fairness, constitution, and constitutionalism. It also includes transparency, accountability in governance. When a democratic rule is genuinely instituted it eliminates all the forms of arbitrariness on the part of the rulers and ruled. It ensures that government business is transparent and predictable, and guaranteed. The states should therefore democratize in all forms, not only the governance, economic, social, and cultural spheres but in their minds, act, virtue, personality. It is a saying that when the 'mind' is democratic, the whole system including its parts would follow the dictates of the mind. Through this, the politics of a "do or die" would be eliminated since the government will reach every segment of society. It will allocate resources wholesomely and no segment or group would be denied the opportunity to participate and express his opinion on national issues.

Constitutionalism
Related to the above is the issue of constitutionalism. Constitutionalism means giving effect to the law or constitution (Anifowose, 2015). Also, it means the operationalization of the constitution. Mere enactment of law without operationalization brings political instability, economic hardship, and the government in disrepute. It is necessary that the government practice or adheres to the law and pronouncement of the judiciary. The government should not select what law to obey and which one it will not obey. Respect for national law and international agreement is very vital for any constitutional government especially when a government/country is a signatory to it.

True Federalism
Watts (2008) argued that 24 countries in the world are federations.

Therefore, if federalism is an ideology which heterogeneous groups in societies agreed/ or believe will bind them together as expressed in the constitution. Principles of federalism must be adhered to forestall the phenomenon of centrifugal forces. Non-adherence to the principles in terms of devolution of powers between the various levels of government

may lead to redetermination of federation by the centrifugal forces. The phenomenon of centrifugal forces had collapsed many federations simply because the goalpost had been changed. This phenomenon has led to a crisis upon crisis leading to civil war, and eventually total balkanization of polities (Watts, 2008). The purpose of federalism is to provide security for all the members, while at the same time ensuring that all members of the union protect and preserve what belongs to them including their resources.

Moribund Institutions
There is a need for the government to holistically overall its institutions to meet the yearnings and aspirations of the people. Efficient institutions will forestall the phenomenon of revolutions and other upheavals. Non-reforms in agencies of government will create inefficient service delivery. The subsequence of this is institutional decay, weakness, division, uncertainty, and political inaction, disorder. These characteristics are what propel revolution and eventually unseat the ruling governments.

Poverty
This is an endemic that tears and causes alienation between modern governments and citizens. The problem of poverty can only be emolliated if the government embarks on employment generation, creating jobs opportunity, empowering the people, diversify the economy, creating energy, and the environment free from inequality, and unjust. Through this, people will be engaged in productive activities against unproductive ventures that will continue to drain the resources of the government.

Intellectual Class
This is another agent in which government must engage in its services. The intellectual class should serve as the engine room for good governance because it can blend, correct, impact the behavior and the culture of the society. The intellectual class should serve as a "think tank" of the government in its policy initiation and implementation; and help to disseminate civil culture, political culture, and complete project of the socialization process. The engagement of this class will no doubt speak the mind of the government, philosophy of the government, and

the philosophy of the society, economic and political philosophy, and social and cultural ideas of the country concern.

Mass Media
This segment makes the government especially when the government is pro-people, and prostate. On the other hand, the mass media mars the government and the state when the government is not pro-people and pro-state. Such a government will be tag illegitimate, uncaring, dictator, and authoritarian because it has failed to yield to the various opinions/suggestions proffered by the other groups in the state. The importance of this group cannot be underestimated because the news reportage in a free and fair environment without censorship enhance the performance and government policy and become meaningful and acceptable in time of plenty and scarcity.

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